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 PROBLEMS OF PERCEPTION IN THE EUROPEAN 
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: A MATTER OF 
EVIDENCE? 
 
Haydn Davies* 
Anne Richardson Oakes** 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper considers that aspect of the jurisprudence of 
Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights 1950 that 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) now terms the 
“doctrine of appearances.”1  The doctrine achieved its current 
formulation and has specific application in the context of the 
national courts’ use of officials whose function it is to act as court 
advisors.  Such officials now come within the ambit of the Article 
6 fair trial prohibitions against bias with chilling consequences for 
an increased use of expertise in the courtroom.2  To the extent that 
its underlying assumptions reflect more general concerns with the 
legitimacy of judicial process which are, broadly speaking, 
common to jurisdictions drawing on the heritage of English 
common law, the doctrine may simply be seen as a contribution to 
what has been termed “public repute discourse”3 by reference to 
                                                
* Ph.D. Senior Academic, Deputy Director of Research, Law School, 
Birmingham City University. 
** Ph.D. Solicitor; Reader in American Legal Studies, Law School, Birmingham 
City University. 
1 See Martinie v. France, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. 15 at 455–56 (2006). 
2 See Anne Richardson Oakes & Haydn Davies, Process, Outcomes and the 
Invention of Tradition: The Growing Importance of the Appearance of Judicial 
Neutrality, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 573, 580 (2011) (noting the difference 
between the terms “bias” and “partiality”); see also Anne Richardson Oakes, 
Desegregation in Boston: The Lens of the Present and the Lens of the Past, 
ANZLH E-JOURNAL, Refereed Paper No. 3, 2011, available at 
http://www.anzlhsejournal.auckland.ac.nz/pdfs_2010/Oakes_Desegregation_in_
Boston.pdf. 
3 See Fredrick Schumann, “The Appearance of Justice”: Public Justification in 
the Legal Relation, 66 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 189, 191 (2008) (arguing that 
“public repute discourse” reflects judicial concerns with the way laws and legal 
institutions are viewed by the public: “Public repute discourse relates to three 
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which courts seek to assert the legitimacy of judicial process, and 
is remarkable, if at all, for the unusual nature of its formulation and 
the specific or indeed idiosyncratic nature of the nationally-specific 
judicial procedures which are its matrix.  From this perspective, the 
scope for empirical evidence of public confidence in judicial 
processes as the determinant of its legitimacy is traditionally 
limited.  The Court asserts that its concern is not with “actual bias” 
or “bias in fact” but with the issue of perceptions, or rather, 
apprehensions of the possibility of bias; in the traditional 
formulation “justice must not only be done; it must manifestly and 
undoubtedly be seen to be done.”4   This may be termed an 
“objective” approach but the “disinterested and impartial observer” 
of judicial process is typically invoked to represent the public 
interest so that in terms of actual flesh and blood, this person is a 
legal fiction.5  Courts do not generally, if at all, seek out or 
commission research findings of this nature and on the occasions 
that it is presented to them, their response can be ambivalent.6 
 Our attention to the formulations of the European Court is 
focused on two specific issues.  First, we note the contention that 
jurisprudence in this area must be responsive to the existence of 
what the Court claims is “‘an increased [public] sensitivity’ . . . to 
the fair administration of justice.”7  We note that the Court cites no 
evidence in support of this claim and its apparently intuitive 
perceptions do not resonate with empirical findings to the effect 
that public responses to the fairness of judicial process depend less 
upon the “appearance of bias” considerations of judicial 
                                                                                                         
general categories of legal issues: (1) judicial impartiality and independence; (2) 
participatory procedural rights at trials and at other adjudicative proceedings; 
and (3) the misconduct of nonjudicial actors in the legal system--in other words, 
lawyers, prosecutors, and police.” Id. at 191).  
4  R v. Sussex Justices ex p. McCarthy, 1 K.B. 256 at 259(1924)  (Lord Hewart 
C.J.). 
5 See e.g. Porter v. Magill, 2 A.C. 357 at 489 (2001); see also Louis Blom-
Cooper, Bias: Malfunction in Judicial Decision-Making, 2009 P. L. 199, 199. 
6 See JUSTIS PROJECT WORKING PAPERS REVIEW OF NEED: INDICATORS OF 
PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE FOR POLICY ASSESSMENT 151 
(Anniina Jokinen et al. eds., 2009). 
7 Borgers v. Belgium, 15 Eur. H.R. Rep. 92 at 108 (1993).  
      ST. JOHN’S JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL      [Vol. 3, No. 2 
& COMPARATIVE LAW 
 
122 
formulation and more upon the extent to which individuals 
consider that they themselves have been treated with respect.8  We 
note secondly that, in some of its Article 6 decisions, whilst 
continuing to use its original terminology, the Court has claimed to 
extend the ambit of its formulations to encompass not merely the 
sensitivities of the public at large, but also those of the actual 
subjects of judicial process.9  From this perspective, regardless of 
whatever pretensions to “objectivity” the doctrine may originally 
have had, these must now be regarded as problematic. 
 Fundamentally, however, these developments raise the 
question of the relationship between judicially articulated norms of 
procedural fairness and the empirical findings of social science 
research.  We now consider the ECtHR’s Article 6 jurisprudence in 
this area in the context of two major empirical studies, one 
American and one British, which have attempted to identify the 
nature of popular attitudes towards the fairness and thus legitimacy 
of judicial process.  We suggest that while the “objective” 
formulations of common law jurisprudence treat these issues as 
non-empirical, those of the European Court may be reflective of an 
under-rationalized but instinctively-felt desire to bridge a 
perceived gap between the traditionally expressed normative 
assumptions of procedural fairness discourse and the empirically-
verifiable and indeed verified desire of those who have been 
surveyed as participants in the judicial process for procedures that 
recognize and are responsive to their human dignity. 
 We utter a note of caution however. The effect of the 
application of the “doctrine of appearances” has been to limit the 
use by national courts of court officials whose primary role is to 
enhance the efficiency of court procedures.10  We suggest that 
                                                
8 See Tom R. Tyler & Peter Degoey, Trust in Organizational Authorities: The 
Influence of Motive Attributions on Willingness to Accept Decisions, TRUST IN 
ORGANIZATIONS: FRONTIERS OF THEORY AND RESEARCH 331, 331–56 (Roderick 
M. Kramer & Tom R. Tyler eds., 1996).  
9 See Borgers v. Belgium, 15 Eur. H.R. Rep. 92 at 108 (1993); see also Lobo 
Machado v. Portugal, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 79 at 94 (1997). 
10 See Oakes & Davies, supra note 2, at 596–601 (arguing that “whilst the 
doctrine is said to rest upon well-established tradition, in terms of its current 
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when the doctrine is invoked to invalidate procedures intended to 
improve efficiency of judicial decision-making in situations where 
there is no empirical evidence to warrant either an assertion of 
actual impropriety or the existence of specific or generalized 
concern, the Court underestimates the capacity of the public to 
make rational assessments concerning basic fairness, to the 
detriment of the quality of the outcomes upon which legitimacy in 
the eyes of the public must ultimately depend.  We suggest that, in 
this respect at least, the Court’s formulations should be more 
nuanced so that they take account of both the findings of social 
research on attitudes to the justice system and the role of effective 
outcomes in securing those attitudes.  We contend that a 
generalized concern that “justice must be seen to be done” does not 
justify a doctrine which institutionalizes suspicion, and which may 
in any case be addressing an aspect of the system that is not 
necessarily of primary public concern.11 We conclude with the 
observation that the fact that the current approach has arisen in the 
context of the specific procedures of national courts is both 
reflection and indictment of the potential of the democratic 
deficiencies surrounding the delineation of fundamental rights in 
the Council of Europe to erode the continued support among 
signatory states upon which its own legitimacy as an institution 
charged with the supranational supervision of human rights will 
also depend.  We begin with an account of the doctrine, noting 
both its origins, which are relatively new,12 and those aspects of its 
interpretive jurisprudence that we find problematic.13   
 
I. THE “DOCTRINE OF APPEARANCES”: ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 
 
A. The Early Cases: The Importance of Public Confidence 
 
                                                                                                         
operation it is in fact a new arrival with a disruptive potential.”).  
11 See R v. Sussex Justices Ex p. McCarthy, 1 K.B. 256 at 259 (1924) (Lord 
Hewart C.J.). 
12 See Oakes & Davies, supra note 2, at 576. 
13 See GEORGE LETSAS, A THEORY OF INTERPRETATION OF THE EUROPEAN 
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 58–79 (2007). 
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The so-called “doctrine of appearances” began life in the 
late 1950s in four decisions of the European Commission of 
Human Rights and Committee of Ministers.14   All four cases 
involved Article 6 challenges to the procedures of the Austrian 
criminal courts.15  In Ofner and Hopfinger, the Commission and 
Committee considered the role of the Generalprokurator of the 
Supreme Court of Austria and specifically whether  the latter’s 
practice of advising the Court’s Rapporteur on a plea of nullity, 
where that advice was given and the decision reached in the 
                                                
14 See Ofner v. Austria, App. No. 524/59, and Hopfinger v. Austria, App. No. 
617/59, 78, Eur. Comm’n  H.R. (1962); see also Pataki v. Austria, App. No. 
596/59, and Dunshirn v. Austria, App. No. 789/60, 49, Eur. Comm’n H.R. 
(1963). 
15  The full text of Article 6 of the Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Freedoms (1950) (right to a fair trial) reads as 
follows:  
1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of 
any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair 
and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent 
and impartial tribunal established by law.  Judgment shall be 
pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded 
from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public 
order or national security in a democratic society, where the 
interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the 
parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the 
opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity 
would prejudice the interests of justice. 
2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be 
presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 
3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following 
minimum rights: a) to be informed promptly, in a language 
which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of 
the accusation against him; b) to have adequate time and 
facilities for the preparation of his defense; c) to defend 
himself in person or through legal assistance of his own 
choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal 
assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so 
require; d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him 
and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on 
his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; 
e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot 
understand or speak the language used in court.   
 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
1950, Art. 6. 
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absence of the defendant’s counsel, contravened the principle of 
“equality of arms” which was said to be “an inherent element of a 
‘fair trial’” protected by Article 6. 16  In the context of the Austrian 
criminal code as a whole, and in the particular circumstances of 
these cases, the Commission was able to conclude that no 
inequality existed in the position of the parties.17  In Pataki and 
Dunshirn, however, Article 6 challenges were sustained where, on 
an appeal against sentence and despite the potential for the 
outcome to adversely affect the defendants’ position, the Chief 
Public Prosecutor addressed the Court in private but the defendants 
themselves were afforded no opportunity to be heard.18  Observing 
that Article 6 did not define the notion of a fair trial in a criminal 
case, the Commission adopted an expansive approach; the 
Article’s provisions were not to be interpreted restrictively and a 
trial could fail to meet the required standard of fairness even 
though the “minimum rights” guaranteed by paragraphs 3 and 2 
had been respected.19  Specifically, the Commission asserted that 
“it is beyond doubt that the wider and general provision of a fair 
trial, contained in paragraph (1) of Article 6, embodies the notion 
‘equality of arms.’”20  
In these early decisions, the basis of the “objective” and 
“subjective” tests of impartiality or bias which later become the 
“doctrine of appearances” is already discernible.  In Pataki and 
Dunshirn, although the precise term is not used, the Commission 
recognized the importance of external perceptions. Conceding that 
                                                
16 Ofner v. Austria, App. No. 524/59, and Hopfinger v. Austria, App. No. 
617/59, 78, Eur. Comm’n H.R. (1962). 
17 See id.  
18 See Pataki v. Austria, App. No. 596/59, and Dunshirn v. Austria, App. No. 
789/60, 50, Eur. Comm’n H.R. (1963) (explaining that regardless of whether the 
Public Prosecutor actually influenced the court, the fact that there was a chance 
of influence meant the trial was not fair); cf. Ofner v. Austria, App. No. 524/59, 
and Hopfinger v. Austria, App. No. 617/59, 84, Eur. Comm’n  H.R. (1962). 
19 See id. (citing Nielsen v. Denmark, App. No. 343/57, 79, Eur. Comm’n H.R. 
(1960)).  
20 See id.; see also JOSEPH M. JACOB, CIVIL JUSTICE IN THE AGE OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS 9 (2007) (explaining that the term “equality of arms” is “more familiar in 
civilian jurisprudence than in the common law […]” and is “an omnibus term 
embracing a number of separate rights” of a disparate nature arising in 
connection with issues of access to the courts and the right to be heard). 
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the absence of any record of the national court’s deliberations 
would preclude a definitive decision concerning the Public 
Prosecutor’s actual role, the fact of his physical presence was 
crucial; the Commission could not ignore the potential effect on 
the public perception:  
 
Even on the assumption […] that the Public Prosecutor did not 
play an active role at this stage of the proceedings, the very 
fact that he was present and thereby had an opportunity of 
influencing the members of the court, without the accused or 
his counsel having any similar opportunity or any possibility 
of contesting any statements made by the Prosecutor, 
constitutes an inequality which, in the opinion of the 
Commission, is incompatible with the notion of a fair trial.21  
  
In this methodology, “objective” analysis operates as a fall-
back position. If potential inequality is to be equated with actual 
inequality then, despite the absence of evidence of actual 
“subjective” bias on the part of the decision-makers, the court must 
err on the side of caution and a decision of incompatibility will 
ensue. 
These Commission decisions are cited some seven years 
later in an Article 6 challenge to the procedures of the Court of 
Cassation in Belgium, specifically the role of representatives of the 
Procureur Général’s (PG) Department.22  Delcourt v. Belgium23—
another criminal case—was the first of several such challenges to 
the Belgian criminal and civil appeals system that were to follow 
in subsequent years.24   The PG’s department is a multi-level 
                                                
21  See Pataki v. Austria, App. No. 596/59, and Dunshirn v. Austria, App. No. 
789/60, 50, Eur. Comm’n H.R. (1963) (arguing that the mere fact that the Public 
Prosecutor was present at the proceedings meant that he had a chance to 
persuade the members of the court). 
22 Article 6(1) does play a part in the earlier decision of Neumeister v. Austria 
but the court decided that Article 6(1) was not engaged in requests for 
provisional release from incarceration.  See Neumeister v. Austria, 1 Eur. H.R. 
Rep. 91 at 132 (1968).  Elsewhere, Article 6(1) is invoked, though 
unsuccessfully, in the context of the timeliness aspect of a fair trial rather than 
partiality or equality.  See id. at 130–31 (1988). 
23 See Delcourt v. Belgium, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 355 (1970) (recognizing an 
allegation of violation of Article 6(1) when a department member appeared in 
the Court of Cassation).  
24 Borgers v. Belgium, 15 Eur. H.R. Rep. 92 at 95–96 (1993); De Cubber v. 
Belgium, 7 Eur. H.R. Rep. 236 at 245 (1985); Piersack v. Belgium, 5 Eur. H.R. 
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organization, which role and personnel differ between the lower 
courts and the Court of Cassation.25  In the latter, the representative 
of the PG’s department acts as an advisor to the court in a manner 
analogous to that of the Advocate General (AdvG) of the European 
Court of Justice with one crucial difference: the PG representative 
retires with the judges during their deliberations, whereas the 
AdvG does not. 26   Notwithstanding this fact, the ECtHR in 
Delcourt found that the PG was not “one of the parties” and thus 
the doctrine of “equality of arms” did not obtain between Mr 
Delcourt and the PG.27  However, the Court made an allusion to 
appearances in similar, though stronger language, to that used 
previously by the Commission in Pataki and Dunshirn v. Austria.28  
Noting that the PG’s representative might well appear as an 
“adversary” to defendants (as opposed to legal cognoscenti),29 the 
Court continued: 
 
The preceding considerations are of a certain importance 
which must not be underestimated.  If one refers to the dictum 
‘justice must not only be done; it must also be seen to be 
done’, these considerations may allow doubts to arise about 
the satisfactory nature of the system in dispute.30 
 
Here, the word “appearances” makes its debut together 
                                                                                                         
Rep. 169 at 177 (1983); Van Orshoven v. Belgium, 26 Eur. H.R. Rep. 55 at 75 
(1997); Vermeulen v. Belgium, 32 Eur. H.R. Rep. 15 at 317 (1996). 
25 See Borgers v. Belgium, 15 Eur. H.R. Rep. 92 at 97 (1993) (quoting Article 
414 of the Judicial Code and noting the duties a PG has when at the Court of 
Appeals and the Court of Cassation). 
26 See Charles H. Koch, Jr., Judicial Dialogue for Legal Multiculturalism, 25 
MICH. J. INT’L L. 879, 884−85 (2004) (noting the AdvG’s duties with regard to 
the courts); see also Mitchel de S.-O.-I’E. Lasser, The European Pasteurization 
of French Law, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 995, 1016 (2005) (recognizing the PG’s 
duty at the Court of Cassation as that of an advisor); see also Cyril Ritter, A New 
Look at the Role and Impact of Advocates-General—Collectively and 
Individually, 12 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 751, 757 (2006) (establishing that Advocates 
General do not take part in judicial deliberations). 
27 Delcourt v. Belgium, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 355 at 370−71 (1970).  
28 Id. at 369.  
29 Id.  
30 Id. 
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with the paraphrase of the remarks of Lord Hewart C.J. in the 
English case of R v. Sussex Justices ex p. McCarthy, although the 
origin is not cited.31  “Looking behind appearances,” however, the 
Court, clearly reluctant to be seen to be interfering with a long-
established legal procedure which “appears never to have been put 
in question by the legal profession or public opinion in Belgium,” 
was not prepared on this occasion to find a violation of the right to 
a fair hearing.32   
This reluctance will continue to characterize later decisions 
related to judicial bias or “equality of arms” where the propriety of 
the institutions of national legal systems themselves are under 
scrutiny as opposed to the role of individual legal officials.33   
Even here, as the Court has made clear, impartiality should be 
presumed “until there is proof to the contrary.” 34  We return to this 
point later. 
The next important case to come before the Court also 
involved the Belgian criminal justice system.  In Piersack v. 
Belgium, a judge who had previously acted against the defendant 
as a public prosecutor was subsequently elevated to the Belgian 
Court of Appeal where he heard an appeal from the defendant, 
eventually decided on a seven to five majority.35  The ECtHR, 
whilst taking pains not to impugn the judge’s personal integrity, 
nevertheless found an Article 6 violation:36 
 
                                                
31 R v. Sussex Justices Ex p. McCarthy, 1 K.B. 256 at 259 (1924) (Lord Hewart 
C.J.). 
32 Delcourt v. Belgium, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 355 at 371 (1970). 
33 See Kress v. France [GC], App. No. 39594/98, 2001-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 at ¶ 
81 (unreported) (concluding that the presence at the deliberations of the Conseil 
d’Etat of the Government Commissioner compromised the apparent neutrality of 
the proceedings for “a litigant not familiar with the mysteries of the 
proceedings”); see also Kress v. France, 12 HUM. RTS. CASE DIG. 357, 358 
(2001) (pointing out that in Kress v. France, the applicant made an appeal 
because she was unaware that the Government Commissioner would submit 
evidence or make an appearance at the trial). 
34 LeCompte, Van Leuven and De Meyere v. Belgium, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1 at 21 
(1981). 
35 Piersack v. Belgium, 5 Eur. H.R. Rep. 169 at 170–71(1983). 
36 Id. at 180. 
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However, it is not possible to confine oneself to a purely 
subjective test. In this area, even appearances may be of a 
certain importance. … any judge in respect of whom there is a 
legitimate reason to fear a lack of impartiality must withdraw. 
What is at stake is the confidence which the courts must 
inspire in the public in a democratic society.37 
 
Here the doctrine starts to assume its modern shape and the 
phrases emphasized above appear virtually verbatim (though 
sometimes extended) in several subsequent judgments (including 
Sramek v. Austria (1985);38 De Cubber v. Belgium (1985);39 Belios 
v. Switzerland (1988);40 Hauschildt v. Austria (1988)41). By the 
time we arrive at Borgers v. Belgium in 1993,42 the doctrine is 
starting to become acknowledged as such:  
 
the . . . concept of a fair trial . . . has undergone considerable 
evolution in the Court’s case law, notably in respect of the 
importance attached to appearances and to the increased 
sensitivity of the public to the fair administration of justice.43  
 
The doctrine continues to develop throughout the 1990s 
and gradually widens into a two-pronged subjective/objective 
formula appearing mutatis mutandis,44 whenever issues concerning 
the impartiality of tribunals or “equality of arms” arise, and in its 
latest outing before the Grand Chamber in 2010 in the following 
form: 
 
According to the Court’s constant case-law, the existence of 
impartiality for the purposes of Article 6§1 must be 
determined according to a subjective test where regard must 
be had to the personal conviction and behaviour of a 
                                                
37 Piersack v. Belgium, 5 Eur. H.R. Rep. 169, at ¶ 30 (1983) (citations omitted) 
(emphasis added). 
38 Sramek v. Austria, 7 Eur. H.R. Rep. 351, at ¶ 42 (1985). 
39 De Cubber v. Belgium, 7 Eur. H.R. Rep. 236, at ¶ 26 (1985). 
40 Belilos v. Switzerland, 10 Eur. H.R. Rep. 466, at ¶ 67 (1988). 
41 Hauschildt v. Denmark, 12 Eur. H.R. Rep. 266, at ¶ 48 (1990). 
42 See generally Borgers v. Belgium, 15 Eur. H.R. Rep. 92 (1993). 
43 Id.  
44 Id.  
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particular judge, that is, whether the judge held any personal 
prejudice or bias in a given case; and also according to an 
objective test, that is to say by ascertaining whether the 
tribunal itself and, among other aspects, its composition, 
offered sufficient guarantees to exclude any legitimate doubt 
in respect of its impartiality.45 
 . . . .  
. . . In this respect even appearances may be of a certain 
importance or, in other words, “justice must not only be 
done, it must also be seen to be done.” What is at stake is the 
confidence which the courts in a democratic society must 
inspire in the public . . . .46 
 
 
B. From Public to Personal Sensitivity: Objectivity and 
Subjectivity in the Court’s Terminology 
 
The effect of these developments has not been universally 
welcomed.  Specifically, the assertion of an “increased sensitivity 
of the public” has attracted criticism from commissioners,47 and 
judges alike,48 and we return to these matters shortly.  At this 
point, we draw attention to a problem of terminology.  In the 
formulations we have examined so far, the Court has employed the 
language of subjectivity to refer to actual bias or 
inappropriate/impermissible predisposition which is independently 
or objectively verifiable, and the language of objectivity to refer to 
the “legitimate doubt[s]” of the projected observations of the 
                                                
45 Micallef v. Malta (No. 6), 50 Eur. H.R. Rep. 37, at ¶ 93 (2010). 
46 Id.    
47  Lobo Machado v. Portugal, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 79, at ¶ 29 (1997) 
(Commissioners Treschel, Schermers, Martinez, Geus, Pellonpaa, Cabral 
Barreto, Bratza, Konstantinov & Svaby).  
48 See Borgers v. Belgium, 15 Eur. H.R. Rep. 92, at 114, 127 (1993) (Marten & 
Storme, JJ. dissenting) (arguing that the Court’s new doctrine is ambiguous and 
that it may only be limited to criminal cases); see also Kress v. France [GC], 
App. No. 39594/98, 2001-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 (unreported)  (Wildhaber, Costa, 
Pastor Ridruejo, Kuris, Birsan, Botoucharova & Ugrekhelidze JJ., dissenting); 
see also Ocalan v. Turkey, 41 Eur. H.R. Rep. 45, at 1055 (2005) (Costa, 
Calflisch, Turmen, Garlicki & Borrego Borrego, JJ. dissenting).  
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public observer. 49   From the point of view of its dictionary 
definition, the choice of terminology here is unusual and possibly 
counterintuitive; “objectivity” generally refers to that which is 
capable of independent verification, i.e., it carries with it a 
connotation of empirical truth.50  Nevertheless, in the specific 
context as we have described it, the meaning is clear; fairness is as 
much a matter of appearance as of substance and the purpose of the 
formulation may be described as “prophylactic” in the sense that it 
is directed towards ensuring that impropriety in fact does not 
occur.51  In this, the Court’s jurisprudence is in line with that of 
other common law jurisdictions which target “appearances” from 
the perspective of the public as represented by the fiction of the 
disinterested, i.e., uninvolved, and dispassionate observer. 52  
Various jurisdictions have struggled to describe such a person but 
the point we stress here is that s/he (and it usually does not matter 
which) is not an individuated conceptualization of a real living 
person with the full range of human emotions but rather a 
generically conceived representation whose function is to occupy 
the role of “the public” to whom the Court’s concerns are directed. 
 In its subsequent jurisprudence which we examine next, 
however, the terminology of the ECtHR undergoes a change of 
emphasis so that its focus is extended beyond that of “the public” 
                                                
49 Micallef v. Malta (No. 6), 50 Eur. H.R. Rep. 37, at ¶ 93 (2010). 
50 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1178 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “objective” as 
“of, relating to, or based on externally verifiable phenomena, as opposed to an 
individual’s perceptions, feelings, or intentions” and “without bias or prejudice; 
disinterested”). 
51 See Deborah Hellman, Symposium, Judging by Appearances: Professional 
Ethics, Expressive Government, and the Moral Significance of How Things 
Seem, 60 MD. L. REV. 653, 653–54 (2001) (describing “‘appearance of 
impropriety’ standards for public officials and professionals” as “prophylactic” 
in character but as she points out the mischief of the test is directed towards 
prevention of public mistake: “appearance of wrongdoing prohibitions address 
instances where the observer mistakes the true nature of the action” so that in 
ethical terms, as Andrew Stark argues, the use of the term needs care); see also 
ANDREW STARK, CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE 25–26 
(2000) (pointing out that in contrast to “conflict of interest” prohibitions, an 
“appearance of bias” test ought not properly be described as “prophylactic” in 
the sense that the appearance itself constitutes the impropriety to be avoided).  
52 See Oakes & Davies, supra note 2, at 575. 
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at large to encompass the perceptions of the actual individuals who 
are the subjects of the judicial process in question. 53   The 
development occurs in connection with the requirement of 
“equality of arms” and begins in the case of De Cubber v. 
Belgium—a criminal case where an appeal judge had already acted 
in a different capacity in previous hearings.54   The judgment 
reiterates the by now standard “appearances” formula but then 
goes further:  
 
any judge in respect of whom there is a legitimate reason to 
fear a lack of impartiality must withdraw. What is at stake is 
the confidence which the courts in a democratic society must 
inspire in the public and above all, as far as criminal 
proceedings are concerned, in the accused.55  
 
Despite the fact that Piersack v. Belgium is cited as 
authority,56 the italicized words of the extract above do not in fact 
appear in the Piersack judgment and seem to have arisen de novo 
in De Cubber. No justification for the extended formulation was 
given but it has nevertheless been used in a number of subsequent 
cases involving criminal charges,57 and became the principal issue 
in connection with the Belgian office of the Procureur Général in 
Borgers v. Belgium where once again the cited authority was 
weak.58  
                                                
53 Micallef v. Malta (No. 6), Eur. H.R. Rep. 37, at ¶ 98 (2010). 
54 De Cubber v. Belgium, 7 Eur. H.R. Rep. 236, at 237 (1985). 
55 Id. at 244 (emphasis added). 
56 Id. (citing Piersack v. Belgium, 5 Eur. H.R. Rep 169, at 179 (1983)). 
57 See Hauschildt v. Denmark, 12 Eur. H.R. Rep. 266, at 279 (1990); see also 
Fey v. Austria, 16 Eur. H.R. Rep. 387, at 398 (1993); Kyprianou v. Cyprus, 44 
Eur. H.R. Rep. 27, at 594 (2007). 
58 See generally Borgers v. Belgium, 15 Eur. H.R. Rep. 92 (1993) (citing to a list 
of cases it claimed applied to cases involving “equality of arms” (Piersack v. 
Belgium; Campbell and Fell v. the United Kingdom; Sramek v. Austria; De 
Cubber v. Belgium; Bönisch v. Austria; Belilos v. Switzerland; Hauschildt v. 
Denmark; Langborger v. Sweden; Demicoli v. Malta; Brandstetter v. Austria).  
Of these, however, only two were on point: Piersack, De Cubber and Hauschildt 
all involved judges acting in a prior capacity; Campbell and Fell, Demicoli and 
Belios involved tribunals said to lack sufficient independence or impartiality; 
Sramek, Langerborger and Brandstetter involved tribunal members with 
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As we suggested earlier, the emphasis on the specific 
perspective of the accused represents a considerable expansion of 
the doctrine.  Confusingly, the Borgers Court also concluded that 
“the official of the Procureur-Général’s department becomes 
objectively speaking [the accused’s] ally or his opponent.”59  We 
make two comments.  The first concerns terminology.  As we 
noted earlier the use of the term “objective” generally connotes 
that which is independently verifiable.  The Borgers use, however, 
connotes the more commonly termed dispassionate (but fictitious) 
observer of common law “appearance” jurisprudence; the 
implication is that any independent person would reach the same 
conclusion.  And so they might, if they were in the accused 
position.  It hardly bears saying that the accused’s viewpoint, 
whilst it is certainly empirically verifiable in the sense that it is 
ascertainable, in terms of position, would not normally be 
described as “objective.”  An accused person who regards a court 
advisor or official giving an adverse opinion as an opponent, and 
one who gives a favourable opinion as an ally reaches this 
conclusion “subjectively,” and understandably, on the basis of their 
own interests.  If the reference to “objectivity” connotes that which 
is independently verifiable, a doctrine which requires deference to 
the (perceived) sensitivities of the public has evolved in this 
element at least, into deference to a perception that is empirically 
verifiable but inherently not “objective.”  On the assumption that 
the reference to an “objective” perspective connotes the more 
familiar reasonable observer of “appearance jurisprudence,” if the 
fairness of proceedings must now be judged by reference to the 
perspectives of both the wider public at large and the individuals 
concerned, it is by no means clear that the two will necessarily 
coincide.  It is perfectly possible that an informed and truly 
independent observer representing the public interest, might, 
                                                                                                         
potential conflicts of interest; and Bonisch involved a tribunal member whose 
previous report had led to the prosecution in the first place.  Of these only 
Brandstetter and Bonisch were decided on the basis of the “equality of arms”— 
the principal issue in Borgers. 
59 Borgers v. Belgium, 15 Eur. H.R. Rep. 92, at 108 (1993). 
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“objectively” see no problem with the role of the representative of 
the PG in the Court of Cassation, provided sufficient safeguards 
are seen to exist, even if that representative’s independent 
assessment of the case is adverse to the interests of the accused.   
  Our second point concerns what we might term “contextual 
fluidity.”  As we noted earlier, the European Court has demarcated 
the general principle of the fairness of proceedings in accordance 
with the subcategories of Article 6(1) to include timeliness, 
absence of a public hearing, independence, impartiality and 
“equality of arms.”60  In some cases, these categories are permitted 
to overlap,61 so that the “appearances” analysis as formulated in 
Borgers has expanded beyond the criminal law to encompass the 
procedure of civil,62 and military tribunals,63 even where these 
have been adjudged to involve questions of impartiality or 
independence rather than “equality of arms” per se.  In others, the 
Court makes a clear, but as we suggest below, possibly 
instrumental distinction between them.  Thus, in Borgers, although 
the Court found a contravention of the principle of “equality of 
arms,”64 it noted that “the findings in the Delcourt judgment on the 
question of the independence and impartiality of the Court of 
Cassation and its Procureur Général’s department remain entirely 
valid.”65  
The effect is that since Borgers the “doctrine of 
appearances” now has an element of unpredictability depending on 
which aspect of the alleged unfairness of proceedings is at issue.  
In cases involving the alleged partiality of judges, tribunal 
                                                
60 See Council of Europe, European Convention on Human Rights Art. 6, Nov. 
4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 22. 
61 See generally Lobos Machado v. Portugal, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 79 (1997).  
62 See Van Orshoven v. Belgium, 26 Eur. H.R. Rep. 55 (1997); see also Kress v. 
France [GC], App. No. 39594/98, 2001-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 (unreported); see also 
Vermeulen v. Belgium, 32 Eur. H.R. Rep. 15 (2001) see also Morel v. France, 
33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 47,  (2001); see also Yvon v. France, 40 Eur. H.R. Rep. 41 
(2005); see also Martinie v. France, 45 Eur. H.R. Rep.15  (2007).   
63 See e.g., Incal v. Turkey, 29 Eur. H.R. Rep. 449 (2000); Castillo Algar v. 
Spain, 30 Eur. H.R. Rep. 827 (2000); Morris v. United Kingdom, 34 Eur. H.R. 
Rep. 52 (2002); Cooper v. United Kingdom, 34 Eur. H.R. Rep. 8 (2004). 
64 Borgers v. Belgium, 15 Eur. H.R. Rep. 92, at ¶ 29 (1993). 
65 Id. at ¶ 24. 
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members and jurors it seems that the Court generally requires 
analysis of “objective,” in the sense of independently verifiable, 
factors that might amount to “sufficient safeguards” of the 
applicant's Article 6(1) rights.66  And even here, post-Borgers, 
more attention seems to have been devoted to “looking behind the 
appearances” in cases where the impartiality of jurors is in 
question67 than in cases involving tribunal members or judges. 68  
However, where “equality of arms” is concerned, appearances in 
the eyes of the applicant alone seem to be enough to render the 
proceedings in violation of the safeguards offered by Article 6(1) 
with no requirement of analysis of “objective” supporting 
evidence; the crucial factor seems to be the accused’s perception of 
who is “objectively speaking,” his or her ally or opponent.69   
The emphasis in cases involving juror bias or allegations of 
partiality on the part of tribunal members or judges on a 
requirement for evidence of actual impropriety has led some 
judges to question the continued role of “appearances” in “equality 
of arms” cases.70  In 1997, Judge Storme in Van Orshoven v. 
Belgium,71 a case similar to Borgers, suggested in his dissenting 
opinion that the Court in its recent case law “appeared to have 
abandoned . . . the principle of outward appearances.”72  If this had 
occurred, as we now point out, it must have done so in a series of 
eleven cases between Borgers in 1991 and Van Orshoven in 
1998. 73   Of these cases Fey, Nortier, Diennet, Ferrantelli & 
                                                
66 See Fey v. Austria, 16 Eur. H.R. Rep. 387, at ¶¶ 28 & 30 (1993); see also 
Nortier v. Netherlands, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. 273, at ¶ 33 (1994); see also Remli v. 
France, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. 253, at 46 (1996); see also Pullar v. United Kingdom, 
22 Eur. H.R. Rep. 391, at ¶¶ 38 & 39 (1996).   
67 Pullar v. United Kingdom, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. 391(1996); see also Remli v. 
France, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. 253 (1996). 
68 Martinie v. France, 45 Eur. H.R. Rep. 433 (2007); Vermeulen v. Belgium, 32 
Eur. H.R. Rep. 313, at 314 (2001); Kress v. France, App. No. 39594/98, 2001-
VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 
69 Kress v. France [GC], App. No. 39594/98, 2001-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, at  ¶82. 
70 Remli v. France, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. 253 at 271 (1996); Pullar v. United 
Kingdom, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. 391, at 399–400 (1996); Nortier v Netherlands, 17 
Eur. H.R. Rep. 273, at 289 (1994); Fey v. Austria, 16 Eur. H.R. Rep. 387, at 
397–98 (1993).  
71 Van Orshoven v. Belgium, 26 Eur. H.R. Rep. 55 (1997).  
72 Id. at 79. 
73 See Bulut v. Austria, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 84 (1997); Ferrantelli & Santangelo v. 
      ST. JOHN’S JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL      [Vol. 3, No. 2 
& COMPARATIVE LAW 
 
136 
Santangelo and Thomann involved allegations of partiality on the 
part of tribunal members or judges, Pullar and Remli concerned 
allegations of juror bias, and only Lobos Machado, Bulut and 
Mantovanelli related to “equality of arms.” 74   Whilst the 
suggestion was certainly tenable in the bias /partiality cases,75 the 
“equality of arms” cases generally maintain the reliance on 
“appearances” first advocated in Borgers.  Thus in Lobo 
Machados, the court commented on the presence of the Deputy 
Attorney-General of Portugal at a private sitting of the Portuguese 
Supreme Court, to the effect that: 
 
Even if he had no kind of say, whether advisory or any other, 
it afforded him, if only to outward appearances, an additional 
opportunity to bolster his Opinion in private, without fear of 
contradiction.76 
 
Again in Bulut, in reference to the Attorney-General’s submissions 
to the Supreme Court of Austria, the Court recalled that: 
 
under the principle of equality of arms, as one of the features 
of the wider concept of a fair trial, each party must be 
afforded a reasonable opportunity to present his case under 
conditions that do not place him at a disadvantage vis-à-vis 
his opponent. In this context, importance is attached to 
appearances as well as to the increased sensitivity to the fair 
administration of justice.77  
 
                                                                                                         
Italy, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 288 (1997); Machado v. Portugal, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 79 
(1997); Mantovanelli v. France, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 370 (1997); Thomman v. 
Switzerland, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 553(1997); Diennet v. France, 21 Eur. H.R. Rep. 
554 (1996); Pullar v. United Kingdom, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. 391 (1996); Remli v. 
France, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. 253 (1996); Beaumartin v. France 19 Eur. H.R. Rep. 
485 (1995); Nortier v. Netherlands, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. 273 (1994); Fey v. 
Austria, 16 Eur. H.R. Rep. 387 (1993). 
74 Mantovanelli v. France, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 370, at ¶ 30 (1997) (differing 
partially because ‘equality of arms’ was only one part of the alleged violation of 
the adversarial principle). 
75 See e.g. Pullar v. United Kingdom, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. 391, at 399–400 (1996); 
see also Remli v. France, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. 253, at 271 (1996); see also Nortier 
v. Netherlands, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. 273, at 289 (1994); see also Fey v. Austria, 16 
Eur. H.R. Rep. 387, at 397–98 (1993) (providing examples of bias and partiality 
cases in which the principle of outward appearances could have been considered 
abandoned).  
76 Machado v. Portugal, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 79, at 98 (1997) (emphasis added). 
77 Bulut v. Austria, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 84, at 103–04 (1997) (emphasis added). 
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Thus, if the “principle of outward appearances” had been 
abandoned, this was not apparent to any noticeable degree in 
“equality of arms” cases up to and including Van Orshoven.78 
Moreover, subsequent cases of this kind seem to rely on outward 
appearances with an enthusiasm at least as buoyant as in Borgers 
itself.79  In any event, by the time we get to the Kress judgment,80 
in 2001 the ECtHR has certainly (re-)embraced the controlling 
importance of outward appearances: 
 
It is for this reason that the Court has held that regardless of 
the acknowledged objectivity of the Advocate-General or his 
equivalent, that officer, in recommending that an appeal on 
points of law should be allowed or dismissed, became 
objectively speaking the ally or opponent of one of the parties 
and that his presence at the deliberations afforded him, if only 
to outward appearances, an additional opportunity to bolster 
his submissions in private, without fear of contradiction.81  
 
In 2006, however, in Martinie v. France,82 the Grand Chamber of 
the ECtHR left little doubt that, where the principle of “equality of 
arms” is at stake, appearances are controlling so that “the mere 
presence” at deliberations of the Government Commissioner (and 
by extension of Procureurs General, Conseils d’Etat, Advocates 
General or law officers performing similar functions),83 whether 
this be “active” or “passive,” constituted an Article 6 violation.84  
 
C. Appearances and the CJEU 
 
The principle of “equality of arms” as applied in Borgers 
has particular resonance for the procedures of national courts that 
retain elements of Roman law practice and employ the institution 
of the Advocate General or its equivalent as an advisor to its courts 
of appeal or cassation.85  We commented earlier on the expressed 
                                                
78 Van Orshoven v. Belgium, 26 Eur. H.R. Rep. 55 (1997). 
79 See Vermuelen v. Belgium, 32 Eur. H.R. Rep. 15, at 31 (2001). 
80 Kress v. France [GC], App. No. 39594/98 2001-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1. 
81 Id. at ¶ 82. 
82 Martinie v. France, 45 Eur. H.R. Rep. 433, at 434 (2006). 
83 Of particular significance in Belgium, France and Portugal.   
84 Martinie v. France, 45 Eur. H.R. Rep. 433, at 456 (2006). 
85 See dissenting judgment of Gölcüklü, Matscher and Pettiti JJ. in Vermeulen v. 
Belgium, 32 Eur. H.R. Rep.15  (1996) and dissenting judgements of Pettiti and 
Storme JJ. in Van Orshoven v. Belgium, 26 Eur. H.R. Rep. 55 (1997). 
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reluctance of the ECtHR to impugn on Article 6 grounds the 
integrity of national judicial institutions in the absence of any 
suggestion of actual impropriety on the part of individual 
officials. 86  We pause here to note a similar tension in the 
jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU, formerly the European Court of Justice or the ECJ). 
The procedures of the CJEU are quite closely modelled on 
those of the French and Belgian appellate court systems. The role 
of the Advocate General (AdvG) in particular resembles that of the 
Advocat Général of the French Court of Cassation 87  or the 
representative of the Procureur Général’s department in the 
Belgian Court of Cassation.  In 2000, Emesa Sugar N.V. invoked 
the “doctrine of appearances,” as it had been applied by the ECtHR 
in Vermeulen v. Belgium,88 against the ECJ’s refusal to permit the 
company to submit observations on a preliminary adverse ruling of 
the AdvG,89 contending that this constituted an infringement of its 
Article 6 rights. 90   Finding against Emesa Sugar, the Court 
distinguished the modus operandi of its own AdvG from that of the 
Belgian equivalent on two related grounds concerning the origin of 
the authority: (i) unlike the Belgian official, Advocates General of 
the ECJ are members of the court, appointed in the same way as 
the judges, “are not public prosecutors nor are they subject to any 
[external] authority,” 91  and (ii) the opinion of the Advocate 
General  is not an  “opinion addressed to the judges or to the 
parties which stems from an authority outside the Court or which 
derives its authority from that of the Procureur Général's 
department” so it “does not form part of the proceedings between 
the parties, but rather opens the stage of deliberation by the 
                                                
86 See supra text accompanying notes 31–33. 
87See MITCHEL DE S.- O.-L’E LASSER, JUDICIAL DELIBERATIONS: A 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL TRANSPARENCY AND LEGITIMACY 113 
(2004). 
88 Vermeulen v. Belgium, 32 Eur. H.R. Rep. 15 (1996).  
89 Case C-17/98, President of Arrondissementsrechtbank te 's-Gravenhage v. 
Emesa Sugar, 2000 E.C.R. I00665. 
90 See generally MARIUS EMBERLAND, THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF COMPANIES 63, 
110 (2006). 
91 Case C-17/98, Emesa Sugar v. Aruba, 2000 E.C.R. I-00665, at ¶12. 
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Court.”92 It followed then that “the ... case-law of the European 
Court of Human Rights [is] not [] transposable to the Opinion of 
the Court's Advocates General.”93 
 However, none of the arguments put forward by the ECJ 
addressed the underlying rationale of the doctrine at issue in 
Vermeulen, to the effect that the applicant would view the 
Advocate General (“objectively speaking”) as an opponent. 94  The 
Emesa decision was predicated on the difference in the status of 
the representative of the PG’s department in the Belgian Court and 
that of the AdvG in the ECJ,95 but what seems to matter in ECtHR 
analysis is not the source of the authority but what that authority is 
directed towards and to whom or what these officers owe their 
commitment.  In Vermeulen, the ECtHR was at pains to point out 
that the official’s actual independence was not at issue and that 
previous findings on the independence of the department 
“remained wholly valid.”96  The principal reason for the finding 
was the contention that the applicant would view the representative 
of the PG’s department as an opponent (or ally).97  In the same 
way, it was open to the ECJ to conclude that from the “standpoint 
of the accused” an applicant on the receiving end of an 
unfavourable opinion from its AdvG might view that official as an 
opponent irrespective of the origins and nature of the 
appointment.98  Nevertheless, the ECJ preferred to satisfy itself 
concerning its Article 6 compliance on the basis of the “actual” 
independence of the AdvG.99  Given the potential consequences, 
                                                
92 Id. at ¶ 14. 
93 Id. at 16. 
94 Id. at 26. 
95 See Charles H. Koch, Jr., Judicial Dialogue for Legal Multiculturalism, 25 
MICH. J. INT’L L. 879, 885 (2004) (reporting that the AdvG’s decision is not an 
opinion to judges from an outside authority, such as the PG, but an individual 
reasoned opinion of a member of the Court); see, e.g., Mariles Desomer, Case 
Law: Emesa Sugar, 7 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 127, 131 (2001) (explaining that the 
AdvG, while being a neutral advisory party, gives a suggestion after the parties 
have finished submissions and before the judges have made a decision). 
96 See Vermeulen v. Belgium, 32 Eur. H.R. Rep. 15, at ¶ 30 (2001). 
97 Id. at ¶ 33. 
98 See, e.g., Koch, supra note 95, at 885–86.  
99  See generally William W. Burke-White, International Legal Pluralism, 25 
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this is perhaps not surprising; these officials are appointed not to 
uphold the interests of the state or institution that employed them, 
but to ensure the quality and consistency of the legal process and 
decision-making.100  Engagement with the “applicant’s point of 
view” would presumably have required reform of the institution of 
the AdvG in the same way that has been necessary in Belgium and 
France.101   
We have commented elsewhere on the implications of these 
developments for the efficiency of judicial decision-making and 
                                                                                                         
MICH. J. INT’L L. 963, 974 (2004). 
100 See Article 13, Protocol (No 3) On the Statute of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union, OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (2010). 
101 The French reaction to the Kress (and Martinie) decisions was  a decree 
incorporating a new procedure . . . adding Article R. 731-7 to the Administrative 
Courts Code to the effect that “the Government Commissioner shall be present 
at deliberations; he shall not participate in them.” See Decree No. 2005-1586 of 
19 December 2005, in Revue Francaise de Droit Aministratif  2006, 298–9. The 
Belgian response is explained in Wynen v Belgium, 32576/96, 5/11/2002)[26] 
explaining the reforms in 2000 to the Belgian judicial code: 
  
A law of 14 November 2000, which came into force on 29 
December 2000, amended Article 1107 of the Judicial Code as 
follows:  
“After the report has been read out, Principal State 
Counsel’s Office shall make its submissions. Submissions 
shall then be heard from the parties. Their addresses shall 
relate exclusively to the issues of law raised in the grounds of 
appeal or to objections to the admissibility of the appeal or of 
particular grounds.  
Where the submissions of Principal State Counsel’s 
Office are in writing, the parties may, at the very latest during 
the hearing and solely in reply to those submissions, submit a 
memorandum in which they may not raise any new grounds of 
appeal. At the hearing each party may seek an adjournment in 
order to reply orally or by means of a memorandum to the 
written or oral submissions of Principal State Counsel’s 
Office. The Court shall fix the time-limit for submitting the 
memorandum.”’ 
 
For changes to the Portugese system resulting from “appearances jurisprudence” 
see Ireneu Cabral Barreto, Les Effets de la Jurisprudence de la Cour 
Européenne des Droits de l’Homme sur l’Ordre Juridique et Judiciaire 
Portugais, in LIBER AMICORUM LUZIUS WILDHABER, 81 (Lucius Calfisch et al. 
eds. 2007).   
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have noted the chilling effect in the U.K., at least for the increased 
use of technical assistants which Lord Woolf’s civil procedure 
reforms originally envisaged.102  We return to these matters later 
but turn now to the concern that drives the jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR in these matters, namely the asserted existence of an 
“increased sensitivity” on the part of the public, a sensitivity that 
we claim owes more to the imagination of the European Court than 
to anything in the way of hard evidence.  In the next section we 
consider the extent to which judicial norms of procedural fairness 
require support from, or at least a connection to, an empirical 
foundation. 
 
II.  APPEARANCES IN LEGITIMACY ASSESSMENTS: A NORMATIVE OR 
EMPIRICAL QUESTION? 
 
When the European Court asserts a need to connect with 
matters of public confidence, it invokes a tradition of liberal 
discourse in which the boundaries, limits, and values of judicial 
procedure are conceptualized in terms of legitimacy.103  Within this 
tradition, what is required is the proper separation of the judicial 
function from the other functions of government and observance of 
“due process” which sees justice as the consistent application of 
rules by means of adjudicative procedures reflecting principles of 
neutrality and participation.104  As we have suggested, at one level 
and despite some eccentricities of expression, we can locate the 
European Court’s “doctrine of appearances” within this type of 
discourse so that when the European Court uses the language of 
objectivity we can understand that it is referring to perspective and 
that the term connotes the disinterested, in the sense of 
dispassionate observer well-known to common law jurisprudence. 
                                                
102 See Oakes & Davies, supra note 2, at 598–601. 
103 See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 120 (Peter Laslett ed. 
1960); see also JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS (John 
Gray ed. 1998). 
104 The so-called rules of natural justice: nemo iudex in causa sua potest (no-one 
can be judge in their own cause) and audi alteram partem (hear both sides). See 
generally PATRICK DEVLIN, THE JUDGE (1979). 
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In this context, as has been pointed out, “[t]he reasonable observer 
of the judicial system . . . is a normative idealization rather than a 
straightforward reading of public attitudes and behaviour.”105  The 
criteria which govern the fairness of judicial process are often said 
to be self-reflexive, i.e, the court holds up the mirror to find the 
reflection of its own experience.106 
However, as Beetham points out, there is another, and 
separate, body of social science literature which draws on Max 
Weber to define legitimacy as a matter of empirically verifiable 
social inquiry; in Weberian terms legitimacy is a function of 
“Legitimitaetsglaube” or belief in legitimacy, so that legitimate 
power is that which is popularly regarded as legitimate or “als 
legitim angesehen.”107  In Tyler’s (contemporary) formulation, 
legitimacy is located in “the belief that authorities, institutions, and 
social arrangements are appropriate, proper, and just.”108  Social 
scientists agree that the issue of legitimacy goes to the heart of the 
law’s authority and that judicial rulings or decisions can be 
accepted by citizens even though they might dislike or disagree 
with them, provided that they recognize the legitimacy of the 
institutions from which they come.109  They support the view that 
fair institutional procedures foster internalized compliance and 
stress the importance of appearance; citizen acceptance of 
institutional legitimacy depends in large measure on the extent to 
which the procedures of the institution or decision-making body 
are perceived to be procedurally fair.110  However, their empirical 
                                                
105 Schumann, supra note 3 at 203. 
106 Id. at 201–02. 
107 DAVID BEETHAM, THE LEGITIMATION OF POWER 8 (1991) (discussing and 
quoting from MAX WEBER, WIRTSCHAFT UND GESELLSCHAFT 23, 157 (J.C.B. 
Mohr ed., 1956) and MAX WEBER, GESAMMELTE POLITISCHE SCHRIFTEN (J.C. 
B. Mohr ed., 1958). 
108 Tom R. Tyler, Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation, 
57 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 376, 376 (2006) (hereinafter “Psychological 
Perspectives”). 
109  See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 26 (2006); Tyler, 
Psychological Perspectives supra note 108, at 379. 
110 See TOM R. TYLER, Public Trust and Confidence in Legal Authorities: What 
Do Majority and Minority Group Members Want from the Law and Legal 
Authorities?, 19 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 215, 233 (2001); TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY 
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studies concerning the factors that influence these perceptions and 
the weight that they carry when balanced against other 
considerations, notably those of efficiency and effectiveness, 
disclose a picture that is much more nuanced than is typical of 
judicial discourse.  
As Beetham has commented: “[i]t is one of the most 
remarkable features about the study of legitimacy that it is 
suspended between two separate bodies of literature that have 
absolutely no connection with each other.”111  We now consider 
the European Court’s assertions in the context of the empirical 
findings of two major pieces of social science research concerning 
the nature and formation of public attitudes towards the fairness 
and efficiency of judicial proceedings. 
 
A. The ‘Increased Sensitivity of the Public’: Intuition versus 
Evidence 
 
Arguably, the whole edifice of the doctrine, perhaps since 
the Delcourt decision and certainly since Borgers, rests on the 
contention that the public is increasingly sensitive to the fair 
administration of justice.112  Given the centrality of Article 6 rights 
to the administration of justice throughout the states of the Council 
of Europe, and the significant effect that the ruling was likely to 
have on the legal systems in those states, we consider it to be 
remarkable that in our review of 69 cases involving Article 6 
impartiality, independence or equality of arms, decided between 
1963 and 2010, we find not one piece of empirical evidence put 
forward either to or by the Court to support this proposition.  In 
Borgers itself Judge Martens’ dissent made exactly this point:113   
                                                                                                         
THE LAW, supra note 109 (finding that the public’s evaluations of the police and 
courts are linked primarily to whether individuals perceive these systems to be 
procedurally fair). 
111 Beetham, supra note 107, at 7. 
 
112 Delcourt v. Belgium, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 355 (1970); Borgers v. Belgium, 1 
Eur. H.R. Rep. 92 (1993) (effectively reversing Delcourt despite almost 
identical facts). 
113  It must be noted that Judge Martens is himself Belgian and thus 
“appearances” may be against him in respect of the impartiality of his dissent.  
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The point made by the Court suggests that since the Delcourt 
judgment there have been “societal changes” in this respect 
which warrant overruling. Thus it echoes a similar 
observation made during the hearing before the Court by 
counsel for the applicant. Counsel provided no specific 
grounds for his suggestion that since the Delcourt judgment 
there had been an evolution in this respect. Neither does the 
Court. It merely refers to its case-law . . . but there one will 
look in vain for a factual basis for the alleged “increased 
sensitivity of the public.” 
 
Yet, general allegations such as this require a proper basis 
in fact. While the legal profession in various member States 
undoubtedly shows an increased awareness of the 
possibilities offered by the Convention, this should not be 
confounded with “societal changes” which eventually may 
entail - and justify - changing the Court’s case-law! 
 
For my part, I am not aware of any specific grounds for the 
Court’s thesis.114 
 
In all the Article 6 cases we have studied, the only allusion 
we have been able to find to any evidence of this alleged increase 
in sensitivity is a comment made by the Commission in Borgers 
itself responding to the Belgian government’s argument that “the 
[Procureur General] system has been in existence for more than 
150 years and has operated without a break and without any public 
opposition whatever.”115 The Commission dismissed that argument 
as follows:  “[w]ith regard to this the Commission would note that 
                                                                                                         
This possibility is a particularly important one to consider in the light of Erik 
Voeten’s findings in relation to the judges of the ECHR when ruling in cases 
where their own country is a party. See Erik Voeten, The Impartiality of 
International Judges: Evidence from the European Court of Human Rights, 102 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 417, 417 (2008). However, there is some “objective 
evidence” in Judge Martens’ favor in that he has delivered dissenting opinions 
along the same lines in Langborger v. Sweden, 12 Eur. H.R. Rep. 416, at 431 
(1990) and Fey v. Austria, 16 Eur. H.R. Rep. 387, at 403 (1993). 
 
114 Borgers v. Belgium, 15 Eur. H.R. Rep. 92, at 129 (1993) (Martens, J., 
dissenting) (citations omitted).  
115 Id. at 105. 
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it has heard criticisms of the system on a number of occasions.”116 
However, these “criticisms” were not reproduced, referenced or 
attributed. Nevertheless, the Court followed suit and decided that 
although in Delcourt the AG was not considered an adversary to 
the applicant, the intervening evolution of the Court’s case law in 
respect of appearances meant that the AG must now be considered 
an adversary.117  This volte face was brought about on the basis of 
no evidence whatever and this despite the ECtHR’s own frequent 
references in previous cases to the importance of objectivity and its 
insistence on retaining an objective element in the assessment of 
appearances.  Thus an important new aspect of Article 6 
jurisprudence seems to have been based on no more than the 
subjective perceptions of the Commission and the Court. 
In fact there was some evidence on public attitudes towards 
legal systems in Europe generally, and in Belgium in particular,118 
that the court could have had recourse to, even in 1993 (though 
admittedly, public attitudes were surveyed more generally and did 
not cover precisely the issue of appearances).119   
 
B. Efficiency, Effectiveness and Fairness: The Van de Walle 
studies  
 
Appendix 2 of the 2008 report summarizes data collected 
                                                
116 Id.  
117 Id. at ¶ 26.  
118 However, most of the detailed social research on attitudes to the law in 
Belgium is more recent, largely as a result of the scandal surrounding the 
prosecution of the pedophile Marc Dutroux. See HUBERT BOCKEN, 
INTRODUCTION TO BELGIAN LAW 18–19 (2000).   In fact, such was the public 
disquiet over the handling of this case that the UN Economic and Social Council 
Commission on Human Rights commissioned a Special Rapporteur to 
investigate the Belgian system of judicial appointments. See Special Rapporteur 
on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, Eur. Comm’n H.R., U.N. Doc 
E/CN.4/1998/39/Add.3 (Feb. 16, 1998) (by Param Cumaraswamy); In TAKING 
FRENCH FEMINISM TO THE STREETS: FADELA AMARA AND THE RISE OF NI PUTES 
NI SOUMISES 124 (Brittany Murray & Diane Perpic, eds., 2011), the authors 
describe how the public demonstrations triggered by the Dutroux scandal  led 
the Belgian government to propose numerous reforms to the justice system. 
119 See STEVEN VAN DE WALLE & JOHN W. RAINE, EXPLAINING ATTITUDES 
TOWARDS THE JUSTICE SYSTEM IN THE UK AND EUROPE (2008). 
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intermittently from 1981 to 2000 from the World Values Survey on 
confidence in the justice system.120  This shows that there was 
indeed a decline in confidence in some countries (including 
Belgium, Finland, France, the UK, West Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Spain and Sweden) between 1981 and 2000.121  The 
same report summarises data from the Eurobarometer survey from 
autumn 1997 to spring 2006 showing that, with the possible 
exception of Belgium, where figures improved considerably in this 
period, possibly due to reforms in the criminal justice system 
implemented in response to the Dutroux affair, the percentage of 
respondents who “tend to trust” the legal system has remained 
relatively constant.122  
However, Van de Walle and Raine’s survey concludes that 
there are no universal findings across all jurisdictions studied and 
the general patterns that do emerge are almost exclusively related 
to the criminal justice system.123   A fairly consistent pattern 
emerged in “general survey[s] on government and politics [where] 
. . . opinions may reflect attitudes towards government and 
institutions in general, or even personal contentment or life 
satisfaction, rather than attitudes specifically about the justice 
system.”124 
This suggests that the justice system itself may not be 
viewed independently of wider governmental and political 
concerns, though the authors point out that the relation is not 
necessarily causal.125  Moreover, where surveys have examined the 
justice system specifically, they tend to be poor at offering 
explanations for attitudes because they usually fail to take 
sufficient account of social and personal stances among 
respondents.126   From our point of view the most interesting 
conclusions from the report concern the need for care in both 
                                                
120 Van de Walle & Raine, supra note 119, at 59.  
121 Id.  
122 Id. at 61.  
123 Id. 
124 Id. at 46. 
125 Id. 
126 Id at 46–47. 
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research design and in the interpretation of results.  The 
“overarching message,” they claim: 
 
is that survey research on the justice system needs to be 
carefully organised along distinctive lines. General surveys 
are unlikely to be particularly useful for detecting and 
designing specific operational improvements. The attitudinal 
data they generate are likely to be embedded in more general 
perceptions about government and public institutions, and are 
therefore unlikely to reveal much about the specific reasons 
for satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the justice system.127 
 
This suggests that even if the Borgers majority had 
consulted general surveys on attitudes to the judicial process 
before reaching their conclusions (which they probably did not), 
their assumption that public sensitivities could be addressed or 
assuaged by widening the scope of the “doctrine of appearances” 
in the way that Judge Martens found so objectionable was over-
simplistic.128 
 Of particular importance is the extent to which popular 
attitudes to the justice system (especially the criminal justice 
system) might be said to be affected by personal experience.  Van 
de Walle and Raine’s report touched on this only briefly,129 but 
more recently Van de Walle has undertaken a more extensive study 
based on a subset of the 2005/6 British Crime Survey and 
specifically designed to test the theory that at least in the context of 
the Criminal Justice System (CJS) the assessments of stakeholders 
are enhanced by experience.130  His review of the earlier studies 
revealed a mixed picture with no direct link established between 
experience of the system and views on its efficiency, effectiveness 
and fairness. 131   The clearest correlation seemed to be with 
perceptions of political and governmental institutions generally, 
                                                
127 Van de Walle & Raine, supra note 119, at 49. 
128 Borgers v. Belgium, 15 Eur. H.R. Rep. 92 (1993). 
129 Van de Walle & Raine, supra note 119, at 47. 
130 Steven Van De Walle, Confidence in the Criminal Justice System: Does 
Experience Count? 49 BR. J. OF CRIMINOLOGY 384, 384–98 (2009).  
131 Id. at 385–91.  
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such that the CJS as a whole became “tarred with the same brush” 
regardless of its actual performance, a finding consistent with Van 
de Walle’s and Raine’s earlier work discussed above.  In other 
words, general contentment with society seemed to color 
respondents’ views, particularly where respondents had no direct 
experience of the system themselves.  However, contrary to 
expectations, studies of those who had experienced the CJS did not 
suggest that their perceptions were necessarily improved as a 
result, a finding which undermined the assumption sometimes 
made that negative perceptions of the system originated in 
ignorance and that greater knowledge of the system enhanced 
positive perceptions.132   Some studies in Canada and France had 
suggested a correlation between experience and enhanced 
perceptions of the system’s fairness but this was not the case for its 
efficiency or effectiveness.133   On the other hand studies in the 
United States suggested that exposure to the system tended to 
produce the opposite result.134  
Many of these earlier studies did suggest that experience 
could have a polarizing effect, in the sense that respondents tended 
to have a stronger positive or negative attitude, compared to the 
more neutral views of those without experience but there was no 
consistent pattern regarding changes in approval rates.135  Van de 
Walle’s more recent study attempted to address the effect of 
experience more directly.136  He used the criteria of fairness, 
effectiveness and efficiency among users of the system drawn from 
those who had: (i) worked in the CJS; (ii) been the accused; (iii) 
been a juror; or, (iv) been in court during a criminal case.137  His 
findings indicated that for those other than the accused, experience 
of the system tended to enhance confidence in the fairness of the 
system but not in its effectiveness or efficiency, a result that was 
                                                
132 Id. at 384.  
133 Id. at 387–89.  
134 Van De Walle, supra note 130, at 395. This was, however, a localized finding 
which does not necessarily reflect the USA as a whole. 
135 Van de Walle & Raine, supra note 119, at 13. 
136 Van De Walle, supra note 130, at 386–87 (2009).  
137 Id.  
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similar to the French and Canadian experiences:138 
 
experience with the CJS generally appears to have a positive 
effect on evaluations of fairness of the system, apart from 
when the respondent has ever been the accused or the 
defendant. Evaluations of the efficiency of the system are more 
negative if a respondent has ever been in court during a 
criminal case or when one has been the defendant, and, more 
worrying, if one works, or has worked for, the CJS. 
Evaluations of effectiveness are more negative among those 
respondents who have ever been in court during a criminal 
case, or who have been a defendant.139 
 
Bearing in mind the limitations of the study, in so far as it 
confirms the earlier findings that, defendants apart, issues of 
fairness matter less than efficiency or effectiveness, there is little 
support to be found here for the ECtHR’s priorities.  To the extent 
that there is a “public sensitivity” or specific concern with aspects 
of the justice system, as opposed to a generalized disaffection with 
social institutions generally, it seems that a continuing refinement 
of the “doctrine of appearances” may not in fact have any 
significant impact among those with no experience of legal 
proceedings, and may be missing the point for those who do.  We 
turn now to research dealing with the specific issue of “subject 
perspective,” i.e. the point of view of the citizen participant in 
judicial process. 
 
C. Dignitary Values versus Outcomes: The Tyler Studies  
 
Some of the largest and most comprehensive empirical 
studies in this area have been undertaken in the United States by 
Professor Tom R. Tyler and his colleagues.140  Tyler’s studies have 
                                                
138 Id.  
139 Id. at 392. 
140 See Tyler, Public Trust and Confidence supra note 110, at 233; see also 
TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW, supra note 109; see also COOPERATION IN 
GROUPS: PROCEDURAL JUSTICE SOCIAL IDENTITY, AND BEHAVIORAL 
ENGAGEMENT (Tom R. Tyler & S. L. Blader eds., 2000); see alsoTyler & 
Degoey, supra note 8. 
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examined perceptions of fairness and the components of those 
perceptions in a range of adversarial and non-adversarial social 
situations including assessments of people exposed to judicial 
procedures of various sorts.141  His conclusions suggest that the 
cognitive processes of assessing fairness in these situations are 
more sophisticated and complex than was previously thought and 
certainly more so than the current “appearance jurisprudence” of 
the ECtHR suggests.  In his studies of reactions to treatment by 
police officers and judges,142 Tyler found that:  
 
[s]ome people interviewed indicated that police officers and 
judges were acting in a non-neutral, biased way, yet 
nonetheless evaluated those authorities to be fair.  People 
seemed willing to forgive surface features … if they felt that 
the authorities were basically motivated to act in a benevolent 
manner.143  
  
Benevolence, for Tyler and Degoey, equates to the 
“trustworthiness of the intentions of the authorities” involved in 
dispute resolution, but in their analysis, what is important here is 
the extent to which that trust is instrumental, i.e. related to the 
expectation that an authority will deliver a favourable outcome, or 
relational, i.e. reliant on the nature of the social interaction and 
sense of identity between the authority and the recipient of the 
decision.144  They reach the conclusion that trust in authorities and 
a willingness to accept the legitimacy of their decisions is more 
closely linked to the latter than former; an authority that treats a 
group with “deference, neutrality . . . and dignity” is more likely to 
be trusted than one that does not and, more importantly, is more 
likely to have its decisions accepted.145  By contrast, an authority 
which does not exhibit these relational features will be less trusted 
                                                
141 See Tom R. Tyler & Peter Degoey, Collective Restraint in Social Dilemmas: 
Procedural Justice and Social Identification Effects on Support for Authorities, 
69 J. PERSON. & SOC. PSYCH. 482, 483–84 (1995). 
142 See generally Tyler & Degoey, supra note 8, at 331–56.  
143Id. at 334. 
144 Id.  
145 Id. at 338.   
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even when there is a perception that its decisions might be more 
favourable.146 
Importantly, Tyler and Degoey conclude that when it 
comes to the “complex cognitive task” of attributing benevolence/ 
trustworthiness to judicial procedures, 147  
 
people tend to engage in this complicated task, even when 
they could rely on surface features such as neutrality or bias.  
People seem to value information about benevolent intentions 
enough to be willing to undergo extra cognitive efforts to 
obtain them.148 
 
In other words, their evidence suggests that their respondents not 
only made a functional distinction between procedures and 
outcomes but, in terms of importance, they prioritized the former 
over the latter so that a poor outcome in a particular instance may 
not necessarily adversely affect a person’s views on the 
benevolence/ trustworthiness of that authority.  These conclusions 
are borne out by Tyler’s subsequent study directed to the specific 
issue of legitimacy: 
 
People’s views about the legitimacy of legal authorities are 
more strongly insulated than performance values are from the 
influence of good or bad experience … and … experience did 
not overwhelm prior views.149  
 
The understanding that procedure can shape the parties’ beliefs 
about the distributive (and not merely procedural) fairness of the 
outcome was not new.  In 1981, Professor Jerry L. Mashaw called 
for a reorientation of administrative “due process” values,150 in 
what he called “dignitary terms,” so-called because they would 
                                                
146 Id. at 334.  
147 Id. at 336.  
148 Id. at 336–37. 
149 TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW, supra note 109, at 94–95. 
150 A reference to the “Due Process” clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution which determines the constitutionality of state governmental 
procedures.  
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demonstrate concern for and be reflective of  “values inherent in or 
intrinsic to our common humanity—values such as autonomy, self-
respect, or equality,” values which “ preserve and enhance human 
dignity and self-respect.”151 
Mashaw’s work was influenced by the findings of social 
psychologist John Thibaut in association with his colleague W. 
Laurens Walker whose experiments suggested that even for 
participants disappointed in terms of outcomes, the way in which 
they had been treated influenced their perceptions of substantive 
fairness.152  “The unifying thread in [the] literature,” Mashaw 
concluded, “is the perception that the effects of process on 
participants, not just the rationality of substantive results, must be 
considered in judging the legitimacy of public decision-
making.”153 
The insight that, in Walker and Thibaut’s terms,  “at least 
with respect to perceptions, ‘ends’ (distributive justice) cannot 
justify ‘means’ (procedural justice), but ‘means’ can indeed justify 
‘ends’ to the extent that for participants, the perception of 
procedural justice partially determines the perception of 
distributive justice, has implications for a “subjective perspective” 
norm of adjudicative procedure, of the kind that the ECtHR 
appears to be developing in the context of its “equality of arms 
appearance  jurisprudence”  if we might so term it.  Should the 
ECtHR choose to justify itself in these terms it will have to counter 
the criticism of Professor D.J. Galligan that the research 
conclusions reflect a conceptual model that is fundamentally 
flawed. 154   The purpose of procedure, argues Galligan, is to 
facilitate the production of good, in the sense of accurate, 
                                                
151  JERRY L. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 162 
(1985); see also Jerry L. Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a 
Dignitary Theory, 61 B.U. L. REV. 885, 885–86 (1981). 
152 W. Laurens Walker & John Thibaut, The Relation between Procedural and 
Distributive Justice, 65 VA. L. REV. 1401, 1416–17 (1979); see also J. THIBAUT 
& L. WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1975). 
153 Mashaw, supra note 151, at 886. 
154 See D.J. GALLIGAN, DUE PROCESS AND FAIR PROCEDURES: A STUDY OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES 52–95 (1996). 
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outcomes (“rectitude” in Benthamite terms).155  On this basis, any 
assessment of accuracy in decision-making must begin from the 
proposition that fairness “rests on the general principle that a 
person is treated fairly if he is treated in a way to which he has a 
justifiable claim.”156  The purpose of procedures is to guarantee not 
only that the legal standards are properly applied but that people 
will be treated in accordance with their normative expectations so 
that the link between procedures and outcomes is necessary to an 
overall account of the purpose of procedural norms; a mistaken 
decision which produces an incorrect outcome constitutes a denial 
of a valid claim and thus an injustice.157  Thus, although we can 
concede that procedural rules relating to judicial neutrality, the 
right to a hearing and equality of arms may have a “dignitary” or 
“expressive” value in terms of the respect due to individuals in a 
liberal democracy, 158  they should nevertheless be regarded as 
primarily instrumental in character because they are immediately 
directed towards the production of good outcomes:  
 
Bias on the part of the decision-maker is condemned because 
of the threat it poses to an accurate outcome, while a hearing is 
important because it is likely to provide relevant and often 
vital information and to reveal a side of the story which would 
otherwise remain untold. The combined effect of such 
procedural standards is the likelihood of their leading to a 
more accurate outcome.159 
 
An “appearance” test can certainly be defended by 
reference to the need to maintain public confidence in the integrity 
of legal process but “[c]onfidence that the law has been properly 
applied [ . . . ] depends to a significant degree on confidence in the 
                                                
155 Id. at 9–12 (discussing Jeremy Bentham’s conceptualization of “rectitude” in 
utilitarian terms to leave little room for procedural protections such as the “right 
to silence, the privilege against self-incrimination, the rules requiring voluntary 
confessions and a general doctrine of fairness”). 
156 Id. at 52. 
157 Id.  
158 Hellman, supra note 51, at 654. 
159 GALLIGAN, supra note 154, at 92 (1996).  
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procedures as a means to those outcomes,”160 and “confidence in 
the result is bolstered by employing procedures which reduce as 
far as possible the risks of error.”161  On this basis, the conclusion 
that concern with procedural fairness can be separated from 
concern with the quality of outcomes is not only “implausible” but 
“beyond credulity” because no real participant would be concerned 
with the process to the exclusion of the outcome of the 
proceedings in question. 162   No claimant denied a proper 
determination of his claim would “praise the fairness of the 
proceedings as the main point of interest.”163  Tyler’s research, 
claims Galligan,  
 
is based on distinguishing between normative standards 
relating to procedures and outcomes respectively; having made 
that distinction, he then proceeds to show empirically that the 
standards relating to procedures dictate whether the process is 
fair.164  
 
The theoretical model has assumed the distinction it set out 
to prove.  
 
D. A Non-Empirical Basis for “Appearances Norms”? 
 
These limitations in the existing research notwithstanding, 
in their traditional formulations, the requirements of “appearance 
jurisprudence” rest upon claims that are empirically verifiable; 
courts must guard against an appearance of impropriety lest they 
undermine public confidence in the integrity of the judicial system 
upon which its legitimacy rests.  Nevertheless, as we suggested 
earlier, courts do not normally test these assumptions empirically. 
Whether or not they should is a matter to which we return shortly. 
For the present, we comment that from this point of view, in its 
                                                
160 Id. at 66. 
161 Id. at 68. 
162 Id. at 92–93. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. at 92. 
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original formulations the “appearance jurisprudence” of the 
European Court despite its idiosyncratic terminology is not 
necessarily remarkable.  The subsequent formulations, however, 
specifically the requirement in “equality of arms” cases, that 
appearances be judged from the point of view of the citizen 
participant in judicial process—or, as we have termed it, a “subject 
perspective,” are much more problematic. Although the views of 
the “subject” of judicial process are certainly capable of 
verification—the subject need only be asked—the Court to date 
does not appear to take this path but continues to ground its 
concerns on the assertion of a generalized need to assuage public 
sensitivities.  We suggest that a possible explanation here is that the 
Court instinctively feels a need to demonstrate respect for Professor 
Mashaw’s “dignitary values” or to put it another way, is motivated 
by a desire to demonstrate its commitment to a principle of equal 
concern and respect.   
As Professor Hellman has suggested, it is possible to 
articulate a normative theory of what we have termed “appearance 
jurisprudence” that is not directed towards the harms that they seek 
to prevent, and thus does not depend upon contestable empirical 
claims.165  In her account, a duty to avoid an appearance of 
impropriety can arise independently of any issue of possible or 
probable consequences by virtue of the nature of the relationship 
between judge and judged.166  The duty arises because there is an 
“epistemic imbalance” in the nature of the common enterprise with 
which they are engaged; whilst the judge is able to assure herself 
that the decision-making process will be carried out in a proper 
manner, the “subject” towards whom the judicial process is 
directed is not.167  This means that 
 
the obligation of the judge to take care to provide the 
appearance of justice to the parties whose case he adjudicates 
grows out of the nature of his relationship with them. The 
                                                
165 Hellman, supra note 51, at 663. 
166 Id. at 653. 
167 Id.  
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limitations under which they operate, in particular their 
inability to know the reasons that truly guide his decision-
making, obligates him to attempt to appear unbiased as well as 
actually to be unbiased. This is not simply because the power 
of the judiciary will otherwise be eroded, but also because the 
judge's relationship to the particular parties before him 
requires him to avoid giving them a reason to distrust his good 
faith.168 
 
Our point is this: if this is the ethical basis of the Borgers’ 
requirements to take account of what we have here termed a 
“subject perspective,” then in empirical terms the Court is “off the 
hook,” but equally the Court should not fear to make this clear. A 
‘respect agenda,’ in these terms, is not likely to be misunderstood.  
Professor Mashaw put it this way: 
 
[T]here seems to be something to the intuition that process 
itself matters. We do distinguish between losing and being 
treated unfairly. And, however fuzzy our articulation of the 
process characteristics that yield a sense of unfairness, it is 
commonplace for us to describe process affronts as somehow 
related to disrespect for our individuality, to our not being 
taken seriously as persons.169 
 
 
Our next point follows.  A desire to ground “appearance 
jurisprudence” in non-consequentialist terms does not dispose of 
questions concerning their empirical effect.  Commenting on the 
reform of the U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Professors 
Chemerinsky and Friedman warned that judges who largely 
control the rule-making process “may overvalue anecdotes and 
opinions about reform and be insufficiently attentive both to social 
science process and to the needs of court users.”170  Professor 
Koppel makes the same point; procedural rules serve normative 
ends but when normative choices are not underpinned by empirical 
                                                
168 Id. at 663.  
169 Mashaw, supra note 151, at 888. 
170 Erwin Chemerinsky & Barry Friedman, The Fragmentation of Federal Rules, 
46 MERCER L. REV. 757, 792 (1995). 
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information, the danger is that the “knowledge vacuum” that 
ensues will be filled by “anecdotes and political rhetoric.” 171  If 
the Court’s “appearance jurisprudence” is not to be regarded in 
this light, the connection with life as it is “on the ground”—as 
opposed to how it may be intuited from the Court bench should not 
be ignored. There is clearly room for specific and targeted 
empirical research into the root causes of public attitudes to justice 
and the application of those findings in judgments relating to 
Article 6.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
We have suggested elsewhere the connection between the 
ECtHR’s “appearance jurisprudence” and the tropes of more 
familiar formulations of fair process which struggle to balance the 
requirements for delivering outcomes that are timely, efficient, and 
accurate with standards of participation and neutrality that are both 
broad enough to inspire confidence but also sufficiently tightly 
drawn to preclude ill-founded and frivolous litigation.172  In the 
context of the redrafting of the American Bar Association’s 
Judicial Code, Ronald Rotunda has pointed out that when the 
courts get the balance wrong there are consequences in terms of 
costs which extend beyond the financial:  
 
We sometimes think, loosely, that ethics is good and that 
therefore more is better than less. But more is not better than 
less, if the “more” exacts higher costs, measured in terms of 
vague rules that impose unnecessary and excessive burdens. 
Overly-vague ethics rules impose costs on the judicial system 
and the litigants, which we should consider when determining 
whether to impose ill-defined and indefinite ethics 
prohibitions on judges. 
Unnecessarily imprecise ethics rules allow and tempt 
                                                
171 Glenn S. Koppel, Reflections on the “Chimera” of a Uniform Code of State 
Civil Procedure: The Virtue of Vision in Procedural Reform, 58 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 971,1001–03 (2009). 
 
172 Oakes & Davies, supra note 2, at 576–77.  
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critics, with minimum effort, to levy a plausible and serious 
charge that the judge has violated the ethics rules. Overuse not 
only invites abuse with frivolous charges that have the patina 
of legitimacy, but also may eventually demean the seriousness 
of a charge of being unethical.173 
 
 
There are obvious dangers for the authority of the judicial 
process from an excessive concern with appearances.  Firstly, as 
pointed out earlier, addressing this concern may not actually make 
much difference to public perception or it may be addressing an 
aspect of the process that is not the primary concern of the public. 
Secondly, such concerns may become self-fulfilling to the extent 
that suspicion and “increased sensitivity” in the minds of the public 
arises because the judiciary itself raises the suggestion that the 
process might be flawed.174  Third, and in this context, possibly 
most importantly, the effect of the ECtHR’s jurisprudence of 
appearances has been to require modifications to the legal 
procedures of member states despite the fact that in Belgium at 
least, and elsewhere by implication these have never “been put in 
question by the legal profession or public opinion.”175  If the effect 
of emphasizing the “subject perspective” of citizens on the 
receiving end of adjudicative procedures is to require adjustments 
to the judicial systems of the contracting states with the all too 
predictable consequence of fuelling the appeal opportunities of 
human rights lawyers, the delays and inefficiencies likely to result 
                                                
173 Ronald D. Rotunda, Judicial Ethics, the Appearance of Impropriety, and the 
Proposed New ABA Judicial Code, 34 HOFSTRA  L. REV. 1337, 1338 (2006). 
174 See Hellman, supra note 51, at 653 (making the same point: “Since ordinary 
people can only assess actions on the basis of information that is generally 
available, the public official or professional must take care to ensure that his 
public actions appear proper. But these protections may backfire. Rather than 
providing a firewall against corruption and self-dealing, the appearance standard 
may encourage public officials and professionals to avoid merely the appearance 
of wrongdoing. Moreover, by widening the range of improper actions--by 
including those that appear improper--there may be more ethics-related inquiries 
and prosecutions, which, ironically, may itself erode public confidence in 
institutions by making it seem that there is far more corruption than was ever 
thought.”). 
175 Delcourt v. Belgium, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 355, at 371 ¶36.id 
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may themselves give rise to a public perception of ineptitude and 
inefficiency that is all too real. 
From this perspective it is tempting to dismiss the Court’s 
“appearance jurisprudence” as yet another manifestation of an 
increasingly federal behavior by which the Court seeks to impose 
models of process on the member states of the Council of Europe 
but which as Lord Hoffmann suggested, has no mandate in the 
Court’s founding legal instruments.176  Lord Hoffman’s critique 
has particular resonance in the context of Article 6: 
 
Because for example, there is a human right to a fair trial, it 
does not follow that all the countries of the Council of Europe 
must have the same trial procedure.  Criminal procedures in 
different countries may differ widely without any of them 
being unfair.  Likewise the application of many human rights 
in a concrete case, the trade-offs which must be made between 
individual rights and effective government, or between the 
rights of one individual and another, will frequently vary from 
country to country, depending on the local circumstances and 
legal tradition.177 
 
In Martinie v. France, Judge Costa, joined by Judges 
Caflisch and Jungwiert in dissent, made the same point:  
 
We contest the very presuppositions of the Borgers decision 
and therefore those of its epigones. Appearances are certainly 
important, but less so than what Freud and others have called 
the reality principle and in any event than reality in the strict 
sense of the term. That the public are increasingly sensitive to 
the guarantees of fair justice is both evident and desirable. 
How, though, does the quality of justice depend on the 
position of “State Counsel” in the proceedings before the 
Court of Audit or on the fact that the Government 
Commissioner takes part in, or is merely present at, the 
deliberations of the Conseil d’Etat? In our view, public 
sensitivity should not be confused with the fantasies harboured 
                                                
176 Lord Hoffman, The Universality of Human Rights, 125 LAW QUARTERLY 
REV. 416–32 (2009). 
177 Id. at 422–23. 
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by the occasional litigant or the arguments advanced by 
certain lawyers. 
8. We take particular issue with the illogical and dangerous 
developments in the case-law. It is illogical to afford the States 
a margin of appreciation, or even a wide margin of 
appreciation (which derives from the subsidiarity principle and 
recognises national traditions) where entirely essential rights 
and liberties are concerned and to attempt to erase often old 
and respected national traditions in favour of abstract 
procedural uniformity, which – imperceptibly – reduces the 
margin of appreciation to nought ... Beyond the present 
judgment and the courts in question here, it is illogical and 
dangerous to bend the Contracting States and their supreme 
courts to procedural rules that are made uniform down to the 
last detail when there are better things to be done regarding 
European supervision of respect for the rights guaranteed by 
the Convention. It is better to accept certain national judicial 
features and concentrate on harmonising the guarantees which 
States must provide in respect of substantive rights and 
liberties: the necessary dialogue between judges will, we 
think, be greatly facilitated by this, in the interests of all, 
domestic courts and European Court alike, and will promote 
justice that is truly “fair”.178 
 
We very respectfully agree. 
 
 
 
                                                
178 See Martinie v. France 45 Eur. H.R. Rep. 15 at 64 (2007). 
